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Abstract
A growing number of papers have studied positive and normative implications of ﬁ-
nancial frictions in DSGE models. We contribute to this literature by studying the
welfare-based monetary policy in a two-country model characterized by ﬁnancial fric-
tions, alongside a number of key features, like capital accumulation, non-traded goods
and foreign-currency debt denomination. We compare the cooperative Ramsey mone-
tary policy with standard policy benchmarks (e.g. PPI stability) as well as with the
optimal Ramsey policy in a currency area. We show that the two-country perspec-
tive oﬀers new insights on the trade-oﬀs faced by the monetary authority. Our main
results are the following. First, strict PPI targeting (nearly optimal in our model if
credit frictions are absent) becomes excessively procyclical in response to positive pro-
ductivity shocks in the presence of ﬁnancial frictions. The related welfare losses are
non-negligible, especially if ﬁnancial imperfections interact with nontradable produc-
tion. Second, (asymmetric) foreign currency debt denomination aﬀects the optimal
monetary policy and has important implications for exchange rate regimes. In partic-
ular, the larger the variance of domestic productivity shocks relative to foreign, the
closer the PPI-stability policy is to the optimal policy and the farther is the currency
union case. Third, we ﬁnd that central banks should allow for deviations from price
stability to oﬀset the eﬀects of balance sheet shocks. Finally, while ﬁnancial frictions
substantially decrease attractiveness of all price targeting regimes, they do not have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the performance of a monetary union agreement.
Keywords: ﬁnancial frictions, open economy, optimal monetary policy
JEL classiﬁcation: E52, E61, E44, F36, F41
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Non-technical summary
The standard New Keynesian model assumes that ﬁnancial markets work perfectly so
that the interest rate set by central banks uniquely determines the cost of credit for
borrowers. The recent ﬁnancial crisis has exposed the weakness of this simplifying
assumption and revived interest in business cycle models with ﬁnancial frictions.
A number of recent papers have studied the eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions on the busi-
ness cycle and the associated monetary policy implications. Overall, this line of the
literature suggests that if ﬁnancial markets do not work perfectly, the central bank has
an incentive to depart from full price stability in response to productivity shocks. How-
ever, the marginal welfare gain of neutralizing the credit friction distortion is rather
low, so strict inﬂation targeting is not far from optimal. While the big advantage of
this literature is that it oﬀers an analytical characterization of the results, its focus
is on models that are very simple. They abstract from endogenous capital formation,
which may have nontrivial consequences, given that ﬁnancial frictions are considered
to be particularly relevant for investment decisions. Also, they do not address open
economy issues and other potentially important frictions. On the other hand, there is a
number of papers incorporating ﬁnancial frictions into a more sophisticated framework.
This literature looks at welfare-based comparisons of alternative simple policy regimes.
However, it does not discuss the optimal monetary policy.
The aim of this paper is to ﬁll these gaps by providing a qualitative and quantitative
characterization of the optimal monetary policy conduct in an open economy facing ﬁ-
nancial frictions. To this end, we consider a medium-size two-country New Keynesian
DSGE model with producer currency pricing, augmented by the ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism. Having deﬁned the optimal policy as a Ramsey cooperative equilibrium,
we discuss the main incentives faced by a benevolent central bank, show how they are
aﬀected by ﬁxing the exchange rate and compare the optimal outcomes to those ob-
tained for a set of standard simple targeting rules. Contrary to the existing literature,
focusing on very simple models, we discuss how ﬁnancial market imperfections interact
with other policy-relevant frictions that are widely discussed in the open economy lit-
erature, such as foreign debt denomination and the presence of nontradable goods. We
argue that a more complex model is a necessary step forward as the policy implications
are sensitive to the types of frictions and shocks we consider in our paper.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, we ﬁnd that if credit markets
do not work perfectly, strict PPI targeting leads to over-expansion (over-contraction)
in economic activity in response to positive (negative) productivity shocks. The related
welfare losses are non-negligible, especially if ﬁnancial imperfections interact with such
frictions as nontradable production. Second, monetary policy should try to oﬀset the
eﬀects of balance sheet shocks, thus allowing for deviations from price stability. Third,
foreign currency debt denomination aﬀects the optimal monetary policy: it should be
more expansionary in response to positive domestic productivity disturbances and less
expansionary if productivity shocks originate abroad. Fourth, ﬁnancial frictions sub-
stantially decrease attractiveness not only of PPI targeting, but also of other price
targeting regimes. In contrast, the presence of ﬁnancial frictions does not have a sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect on the performance of a monetary union agreement.
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1
1 Introduction
The standard New Keynesian model assumes that ﬁnancial markets work perfectly so
that the interest rate set by central banks uniquely determines the cost of credit for
borrowers. The recent ﬁnancial crisis has exposed the weakness of this simplifying
assumption and revived interest in business cycle models with ﬁnancial frictions. A
growing number of papers follow the trail set by seminal works developed in this ﬁeld
in the 1990s (see, among others, Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist, 1999; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). To our knowl-
edge, nevertheless, none of these explores the optimal-policy implications of ﬁnancial
frictions in a medium-sized two-country DSGE model that includes other policy-relevant
frictions that are widely discussed in the open economy literature.
The aim of this paper is to ﬁll these gaps by providing a qualitative and quanti-
tative characterization of the optimal monetary policy conduct in an open economy
facing ﬁnancial frictions. To this end, we consider a medium-size two-country New
Keynesian DSGE model with producer currency pricing, augmented by the ﬁnancial
accelerator mechanism (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999). Having deﬁned the
optimal policy as a Ramsey cooperative equilibrium, we discuss the main incentives
faced by a benevolent central bank, show how they are aﬀected by ﬁxing the exchange
rate and compare the optimal outcomes to those obtained for a set of standard simple
targeting rules. Contrary to the existing literature, focusing on very simple models, we
discuss how ﬁnancial market imperfections interact with such frictions as foreign debt
denomination and the presence of nontradable goods. We argue that a richer model is
a necessary step forward as the policy implications are sensitive to the types of frictions
and shocks we consider in our paper.
To build intuition for the main results, we start with a simple New Keynesian frame-
work with capital accumulation and then build it up, explaining the impact of each
extension for the policy prescriptions. Our main results can be summarized as follows.
First, we ﬁnd that if credit markets do not work perfectly, strict PPI targeting leads
to over-expansion (over-contraction) in economic activity in response to positive (neg-
ative) productivity shocks. The related welfare losses are non-negligible, especially if
ﬁnancial imperfections interact with such frictions as nontradable production. Second,
monetary policy should try to oﬀset the eﬀects of balance sheet shocks, thus allowing
for deviations from price stability. Third, foreign currency debt denomination aﬀects
the optimal monetary policy: it should be more expansionary in response to positive
domestic productivity disturbances and less expansionary if productivity shocks origi-
nate abroad. Fourth, ﬁnancial frictions substantially decrease attractiveness not only
of PPI targeting, but also of other price targeting regimes. In contrast, the presence of
ﬁnancial frictions does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the performance of a monetary
union agreement.
A number of recent papers have studied the eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions on the busi-
ness cycle and the associated monetary policy implications. For instance, Curdia and
Woodford (2008) extend the basic New Keynesian monetary model to allow for a spread
between interest rates faced by savers and borrowers. They show that if spreads are
purely exogenous, the optimal policy conduct does not diﬀer substantially from the fric-
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tionless case. Allowing for endogenous spreads (in a reduced-form way, i.e. by making
them dependent on borrowers’ debt) aﬀects this conclusion only modestly. In particu-
lar, complete price stabilization is still very close to the optimal policy. Furthermore,
adjusting the intercept in the Taylor rule by changes in credit spreads improves upon
an unadjusted rule.
A more micro-founded contribution is oﬀered by Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian
(2010), who incorporate agency costs into a standard New Keynesian model. Since
agency costs manifest themselves as endogenous cost-push shocks, maintaining price
stability is not optimal in response to productivity shocks. However, it is very close
to optimal even if agency costs are quite severe. A similar conclusion is reached by
Demirel (2009) and Fiore and Tristani (2009), who introduce costly state veriﬁcation
into a model with a direct credit channel ´ a la Ravenna and Walsh (2006), in which
ﬁrms need to borrow in advance to ﬁnance production.
Overall, this line of the literature suggests that if ﬁnancial markets do not work
perfectly, the central bank has an incentive to depart from full price stability in response
to productivity shocks. However, the marginal welfare gain of neutralizing the credit
friction distortion is rather low, so strict inﬂation targeting is not far from optimal.
While the big advantage of the literature surveyed above is that it oﬀers an analytical
characterization of the results, its focus is on models that are very simple. They abstract
from endogenous capital formation, which may have nontrivial consequences, given that
ﬁnancial frictions are considered to be particularly relevant for investment decisions.
Also, they do not address open economy issues and other potentially important frictions.
On the other hand, there is a number of papers incorporating ﬁnancial frictions into
a more sophisticated framework. This literature looks at welfare-based comparisons of
alternative simple policy regimes without discussing the optimal monetary policy.
For instance, building on Faia and Monacelli (2007), Faia (2010) considers a general
class of Taylor rules, with strict inﬂation and exchange rate targeting as extremes, in
a two-country sticky price model with ﬁnancial accelerator as in Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999). Using the welfare rankings that ignore the eﬀect of volatilities
on mean welfare, she ﬁnds that the presence of credit frictions strengthens the case for
ﬂoating exchange rate regimes in economies facing external shocks. She also ﬁnds that
the currency denomination of debt does not change her results. Our paper departs from
her work in that we discuss the implications of ﬁnancial frictions for optimal policy,
highlighting the extent to which the international dimension can play an important
role.1
A related line of papers consider a small open economy model with ﬁnancial frictions
and foreign denomination of debt. Gertler et al. (2007) ﬁnd that a ﬁxed exchange regime
exacerbates the contraction caused by an adverse risk premium shock. According to
Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006), ﬁnancial frictions magnify volatility but do not aﬀect
the ranking of alternative policy rules. Finally, Elekdag and Tchakarov (2007) show
that at a certain level of leverage the peg starts to dominate the ﬂoat if shocks originate
abroad.
1Faia (2007a,b) studies the eﬀects of ﬁnancial frictions on the international business cycle, also in
the case of a currency area. She ﬁnds that the more similar the ﬁnancial systems the stronger the
business cycle comovements.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the structure of our model. Section
3 discusses its calibration. The welfare-based framework for evaluating alternative
policies is presented in section 4. The incentives faced by an optimizing policy maker
are discussed in section 5. Section 6 presents our more detailed results. Section 7
concludes.
2 Structure of the model
There are two countries in the world: Home (H) and Foreign (F). Each is inhabited
by a continuum of inﬁnite-lived households, who consume a homogeneous consumption
good and supply labor to a continuum of ﬁrms. A perfectly competitive sector of capital
producers combines the existing capital with investment ﬂows to produce the installed
capital stock. Capital is managed and rented to ﬁrms by a continuum of entrepreneurs,
who use their net worth and a bank loan to ﬁnance the capital expenditures. Produc-
tivity of each entrepreneur is subject to an idiosyncratic shock, not observed by the
bank. This creates agency problems and so interest charged by the banking sector is
subject to a premium over the risk-free rate paid by banks on households’ deposits, as
in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
There are two types of ﬁrms in each economy, each using capital and labor as inputs.
Nontradable goods producers sell their output only domestically, while tradable goods
ﬁrms produce both for the local market and for exports. Prices are denominated in the
producer currency and set in a monopolistically competitive fashion. Nontradable and
tradable goods produced at home are combined with goods imported from abroad into
ﬁnal consumption and investment goods in a perfectly competitive environment.
International ﬁnancial markets are complete. Fiscal authorities ﬁnance their expen-
ditures on nontradable goods by collecting lump sum taxes from the households.
Since the general setup of the Foreign country is similar to that for the Home
economy, in the following and more detailed exposition we focus on the latter. To the
extent needed, variables and parameters referring to foreign agents are marked with an
asterisk. Unless stated otherwise, all variables in the derivations below are expressed in
per capita terms. Whenever aggregation across countries is needed, we make use of the
normalization of the world population to one so that the size of Home is n and that of
Foreign is 1 − n.
2.1 Households
Households in a given country are assumed to be homogeneous, i.e. they have the same
preferences and endowments and do not face any idiosyncratic shocks nor frictions.
Hence, we can focus on the optimization problem of a representative household.
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where Et is the expectation operator conditioning on information available at time t,
β is the discount rate, σ is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
κ is the weight of leisure in utility and ϕ denotes the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply. The instantaneous utility is thus a function of a consumption bundle Ct,
to be deﬁned below, and labor eﬀort Lt. The utility is also aﬀected by a consumption
preference shock εd,t, common to all households in a given country.




t Dt+1+Et [Qt+1Bt+1]=WtLt+RK,tKt+DivH,t+DivN,t+Tt+Tr E,t+Dt+Bt
(2)
where PC,t is the price of the consumption bundle Ct, Wt is the nominal wage rate,
RK,t denotes households’ income from renting a unit of capital Kt, DivH,t and DivN,t
are dividends from tradable and nontradable goods producers, respectively, Tt stands
for lump sum government transfers net of lump sum taxes, and Tr E,t denotes wealth
received from exiting (net of transfers to surviving and entering) entrepreneurs. House-
holds hold their ﬁnancial wealth in form of bank deposits Dt, paying the risk-free (gross)
rate Rt. As in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002), we assume complete international
markets for state-contingent claims. This means that households have also access to
state-contingent bonds Bt, paying the stochastic return Qt.
The ﬁrst order conditions to the representative consumer maximization problem










ΛC,t ,Π C,t denotes consumer price inﬂation (CPI), expressed in gross




The consumption bundle Ct consists of ﬁnal tradable goods CT,t and nontradable









c (1 − γc)1−γc (5)
where γc is the share of tradable goods in total consumption.






αα(1 − α)1−α (6)
where CH,t is the bundle of home-made tradable goods consumed at home, CF,t is the
bundle of foreign-made tradable goods consumed at home and α denotes the share of
home goods in the home basket of tradable goods.
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The indices of nontradable and both types of tradable goods are in turn given by




























where φN, φH, and φF are the elasticities of substitution across varieties of a given type.
The sequence of intratemporal optimization problems implies the following demand
functions for each variety of goods:
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There is a continuum of perfectly competitive capital producers, owned by households.
At the end of each period, they buy capital from entrepreneurs and combine it with
investment goods to produce new installed capital, which is then sold to entrepreneurs.
Consistently with the market clearing on the capital market, the total amount of
capital purchased by capital producers must be equal to total undepreciated capital
stock in the economy. Hence, the economy-wide capital available for production Kt
evolves according to the formula:
Kt+1 = (1 − τ)Kt + εi,t (1 − ΓI,t)It (19)
where It is investment and τ is the depreciation rate. As in Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005), capital accumulation is subject to investment-speciﬁc technological










The optimization problem of a representative capital producer is to maximize the








[QT,t+kPC,t+k ((1 − τ)Kt+k + εi,t+k (1 − ΓI,t+k)It+k − Kt+k) − PI,t+kIt+k]
￿
(21)
where PI,t is the price of investment goods It and QT,t is the real price of installed
capital (Tobin’s Q).























The ﬁnal investment good is produced in a similar fashion as the ﬁnal consumption





















Hence, while we allow for diﬀerences in the tradable-nontradable composition be-
tween the ﬁnal consumption basket and the investment basket (i.e. γc need not be equal
to γi), we assume for simplicity that the structure of the purely tradable component is
identical for both types of goods.
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2.3 Entrepreneurs and banks
Capital services to ﬁrms are supplied by a continuum of risk-neutral entrepreneurs,
indexed by zE. At the end of period t, each entrepreneur purchases installed capital
Kt+1(zE) from capital producers, partly using its own ﬁnancial wealth Nt+1(zE) and
ﬁnancing the remainder by a bank loan BE,t+1(zE):
BE,t+1(zE)=QT,tPC,tKt+1(zE) − Nt+1(zE) ≥ 0 (26)
After the purchase, each entrepreneur experiences an idiosyncratic productivity
shock, which converts its capital to aE(zE)Kt+1(zE), where aE is a random variable, dis-
tributed independently over time and across entrepreneurs, with a cumulative density
function F(aE) and a unit mean. Following Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2003),
we assume that this distribution is log normal, with a time-varying standard deviation
of logaE equal to εe,tσE, known to entrepreneurs before their capital decisions.
Next, each entrepreneur rents out capital services, treating the rental rate RK,t+1
as given. Since the mean of an idiosyncratic shock is equal to one, the average rate of
return on capital earned by entrepreneurs can be written as:
RE,t+1 =
RK,t+1 + (1 − τ)QT,t+1PC,t+1
QT,tPC,t
(27)
and the rate of return earned by an individual entrepreneur is aE(zE)RE,t+1.
Idiosyncratic shocks are observed by entrepreneurs but not by banks, so lending
involves agency costs, reﬂected in a debt contract between these two parties. The
contract speciﬁes the size of the loan BE,t+1(zE) and the gross non-default interest rate
RB,t+1(zE) charged by the bank. The solvency criterion can also be deﬁned in terms
of a cut-oﬀ value of idiosyncratic productivity, denoted as ˜ aE,t+1(zE), such that the
entrepreneur has just enough resources to repay the loan:2
˜ aE,t+1RE,t+1QT,tPC,tKt+1(zE)=RB,t+1BE,t+1(zE) (28)
Entrepreneurs with aE below the threshold level go bankrupt. Their all resources
are taken over by banks, after they pay proportional and nontradable monitoring costs
µ.
Banks ﬁnance their loans by issuing time deposits to households at the risk-free
interest rate Rt. The banking sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive and owned
by risk-averse households. This together with risk-neutrality of entrepreneurs implies a
ﬁnancial contract insulating the lender from any aggregate risk.3 Hence, interest paid
on a bank loan by entrepreneurs is state contingent and guarantees that banks break
even in every period. The aggregate zero proﬁt condition for the banking sector can be
written as:
2In order to save on notation, in what follows we use the result established later on, according to
which the cutoﬀ productivity ˜ aE(zE) and the non-default interest paid on a bank loan RB,t+1(zE) are
the same for all entrepreneurs.
3Given the inﬁnite number of entrepreneurs, the risk arising from idiosyncratic shocks is fully
diversiﬁable.
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(1 − F1,t+1)RB,t+1BE,t+1 + (1 − µ)F2,t+1RE,t+1QT,tPC,tKt+1 = RtBE,t+1 (29)
or equivalently (using (28)):










and the analytical formulas for F1,t and F2,t, making use of the log-normal assumption
for F(aE), are given in the Appendix.
The equilibrium debt contract maximizes welfare of each individual entrepreneur.
We deﬁne it in terms of expected end-of-contract net worth relative to the risk-free
alternative, which is holding a domestic bond:
Et
￿￿ ∞




The ﬁrst-order condition to this optimization problem can be written as:
Et
￿ RE,t+1

















arises because of monitoring costs. If µ is set to zero, the expected rate of return on
capital is equal to the risk-free interest rate and so the ﬁnancial markets are frictionless.
Equation (34), together with the bank zero proﬁt constraint (30), deﬁnes the optimal
debt contract in terms of the cutoﬀ value of the idiosyncratic shock ˜ aE,t+1 and the





4See e.g. Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007) for a reduced-form representation of the ﬁnancial
accelerator.
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of a cut-oﬀ value of idiosyncratic productivity, denoted as ˜ aE,t+1(zE), such that the
entrepreneur has just enough resources to repay the loan:2
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Entrepreneurs with aE below the threshold level go bankrupt. Their all resources
are taken over by banks, after they pay proportional and nontradable monitoring costs
µ.
Banks ﬁnance their loans by issuing time deposits to households at the risk-free
interest rate Rt. The banking sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive and owned
by risk-averse households. This together with risk-neutrality of entrepreneurs implies a
ﬁnancial contract insulating the lender from any aggregate risk.3 Hence, interest paid
on a bank loan by entrepreneurs is state contingent and guarantees that banks break
even in every period. The aggregate zero proﬁt condition for the banking sector can be
written as:
2In order to save on notation, in what follows we use the result established later on, according to
which the cutoﬀ productivity ˜ aE(zE) and the non-default interest paid on a bank loan RB,t+1(zE) are
the same for all entrepreneurs.
3Given the inﬁnite number of entrepreneurs, the risk arising from idiosyncratic shocks is fully
diversiﬁable.
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It is easy to verify that these two contract parameters are identical across en-
trepreneurs. There are two important implications of this result, facilitating aggre-
gation. First, the loan amount taken by each entrepreneur is proportional to his net






We will refer to the diﬀerence between this rate and the risk-free rate Rt as the
credit spread. Finally, it is easy to show that
χt = χ(￿t,µ) (38)
where χ(￿t,0) = 1, χ￿t (￿t,µ) > 0 and χµ (￿t,µ) > 0.
Proceeds from selling capital, net of interest paid to banks, constitute end of pe-
riod net worth. To capture the phenomenon of ongoing entries and exits of ﬁrms and
to ensure that entrepreneurs do not accumulate enough wealth to become fully self-
ﬁnancing, we assume that each period a randomly selected and time-varying fraction
1 − εν,tυ of them go out of business, in which case all their ﬁnancial wealth is rebated
to the households. At the same time, an equal number of new entrepreneurs enters,
so that the total number of entrepreneurs is constant. Those who survive and enter
receive a transfer TE from households. This ensures that both entrants and surviving
bankrupt entrepreneurs have at least a small but positive amount of wealth, without
which they would not be able to buy any capital.
Aggregating across all entrepreneurs and using (30) yields the following law of mo-













The term in the square brackets represents the total revenue from renting and selling
capital net of interest paid on bank loans, averaged over both bankrupt and non-
bankrupt entrepreneurs.
While discussing our results, we also consider a situation in which bank loans taken
by entrepreneurs in the home country are denominated in foreign rather than domestic




There exist a continuum of identically monopolistic competitive ﬁrms in each of the
nontradable and tradable sectors, owned by households and indexed by zN and zH, re-
spectively. The production technology is homogenous with respect to labor and capital
inputs:
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to the households. At the same time, an equal number of new entrepreneurs enters,
so that the total number of entrepreneurs is constant. Those who survive and enter
receive a transfer TE from households. This ensures that both entrants and surviving
bankrupt entrepreneurs have at least a small but positive amount of wealth, without
which they would not be able to buy any capital.
Aggregating across all entrepreneurs and using (30) yields the following law of mo-













The term in the square brackets represents the total revenue from renting and selling
capital net of interest paid on bank loans, averaged over both bankrupt and non-
bankrupt entrepreneurs.
While discussing our results, we also consider a situation in which bank loans taken
by entrepreneurs in the home country are denominated in foreign rather than domestic




There exist a continuum of identically monopolistic competitive ﬁrms in each of the
nontradable and tradable sectors, owned by households and indexed by zN and zH, re-









where ηN and ηH are sector-speciﬁc capital shares, while εn,t and εt,t are sector-speciﬁc




















Since all ﬁrms in a given sector operate technologies with the same relative inten-
sity of productive factors and face the same prices for labor and capital inputs (fac-














Firms producing nontradable goods set their prices according to the Calvo (1983) stag-
gering mechanism. Only a fraction 1−θN of them set their prices in a forward-looking
manner, while the prices of ﬁrms that do not receive a price signal are fully indexed to
the steady-state inﬂation in the nontradable sector ¯ ΠN.
Firms that are allowed to reoptimize realize that they may not be allowed to do so
for some time, hence their price-setting problem is to maximize the expected present









































16 The ﬁrst-order condition associated with the proﬁt-maximization problem faced by






















There are no ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks in the model, so all ﬁrms that are allowed to
reset their price in a forward-looking manner select the same optimal price ˜ PN,t, which












































The price-setting problem solved by ﬁrms producing tradable goods is similar and
leads to ﬁrst-order conditions and price indices analogous to equation (48) and (52),
respectively. We assume that prices are set in the producer currency and that the
international law of one price holds for each tradable variety. Therefore, the prices of








where St is the nominal exchange rate expressed as units of domestic currency per one
unit of foreign currency.
2.5 Exchange rate dynamics
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and where κ is a constant depending on initial wealth distribution and therefore is equal
to 1 in our model.
Perfect risk sharing combined with the consumption Euler equation (3) and its

















The real exchange rate is allowed to deviate from the purchasing power parity (PPP)
due to changes in relative prices of tradable vs. nontradable goods in both countries
(the internal exchange rates) and changes in terms-of-trade, as long as there is some
home bias in preferences (α ￿= α∗). This can be demonstrated using the price indices



















and the internal exchange rates Xt and X∗












2.6 Monetary and ﬁscal authorities
We consider several variants of monetary policy regimes, including the Ramsey opti-
mal policy. For calibration, we assume that the monetary authority responds to the


















where Yt is total output, ¯ R is the steady state interest rate and εm,t is a monetary policy
shock.
The ﬁscal authority is modeled in a very simplistic fashion: government expenditures
and transfers to the households are fully ﬁnanced by lump sum taxes, so that the
government’s budget is balanced each period. The government spending is fully directed
at nontradable goods and is modeled as a stochastic process εg,t.
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2.7 Market clearing conditions
2.7.1 Goods markets
The model is closed by imposing the following market clearing conditions. Output
of each ﬁrm producing nontradable goods is either consumed domestically, spent on
investment, purchased by the government or used by banks to cover monitoring costs.
Similarly, all tradable goods are consumed or invested, either domestically or abroad.
Using these conditions, the demand functions (10), (11) and (12), together with their
analogs for investment and government goods, the output indexes given by (42) and
(43), and taking into account the size of both countries, one can write aggregate output
in the two sectors at home as:
YN,t = (1 − γc)
PC,t
PN,t
Ct + (1 − γi)
PI,t
PN,t






































Total output Yt is the sum of output produced in the nontradable and tradable
sectors:
PtYt = PN,tYN,t + PH,tYH,t (63)
where Pt is the implicit total output deﬂator, which deﬁnes the producer price inﬂation
(PPI).
2.7.2 Factor markets
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The following laws of motion for the two dispersion indexes can be derived using
(52):




















As shown in Benigno and Woodford (2004), these laws of motion can be written, to
second order, as proportional to the square of sector-speciﬁc inﬂation.
2.7.3 Financial markets
Finally, in equilibrium, household deposits at banks must be equal to total funds lent
to entrepreneurs:
Dt = BE,t (71)
2.8 Exogenous shocks
The source of exogenous disturbances is key in determining the welfare costs of the
business cycle and, in particular, the costs of alternative monetary policies. In order
to give quantitative predictions of the welfare costs that are empirically relevant we
consider a set of shocks that is representative of the source of exogenous disturbances
discussed in the related literature. In particular we consider eight stochastic distur-
bances per country. These concern: productivity in the tradable sector, productivity
in the nontradable sector, consumption preferences, government spending, investment-
speciﬁc technology, survival of entrepreneurs, idiosyncratic riskiness and the monetary
policy. The log of each shock follows a linear ﬁrst-order autoregressive process, except
for the monetary policy shock, which is assumed to be white noise.5
5See for example Stockman and Tesar (1995), Dotsey and Duarte (2008), Gilchrist, Ortiz, and
Zakrajˇ sek (2009), Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010) and Coenen, Lombardo, Smets, and Straub
(2009).
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3 Calibration
We calibrate our model to the euro area economy, setting its size in our two-country
world to 0.25. The parameters for the rest of the world are assumed to be identical
to those in the euro area. Our calibration proceeds in two steps. We ﬁrst match
the key steady-state ratios of the euro area and set the other structural parameters
so that they are consistent with the estimated version of the New Area-Wide Model
(NAWM), documented in Christoﬀel, Coenen, and Warne (2008). While parameterizing
the ﬁnancial frictions block, we draw on Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010). In particular, we set the ﬁnancial sector
parameters such that half of capital is ﬁnanced by debt. In the next step, the inertia
and volatility of stochastic disturbances are chosen to match the moments of a standard
set of euro area macroaggregates and two ﬁnancial variables. These are the debt of
the enterprise sector and the spread between interest charged on loans to ﬁrms and
the short-term yield on government bonds. The results of the calibration exercise are
reported in Tables 1 to 4 and the resulting variance decomposition is shown in Table 5.
Tables 1 to 5 about here
Our model replicates the standard deviations of GDP and its main components. It
signiﬁcantly underestimates the volatility of the short-term interest rate and roughly
captures that of inﬂation. As regards our two ﬁnancial variables, there is some trade-oﬀ
in matching the standard deviation of entrepreneurs’ debt and that of credit spreads.
In principle, a better ﬁt could be obtained by increasing the volatility of the survival
shock at the expense of the riskiness shock, but would require signiﬁcant deviations
from the econometric estimates obtained by Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010).
Turning to other moment matching results, our model gets the persistence and
cyclical behaviour of most of the variables of interest more or less right, although the
ﬁt for investment can be seen as disappointing, given the model’s focus on frictions
in ﬁnancing capital expenditures. It is also worth noting that while our model makes
the premium less countercyclical than in the data, it somewhat exaggerates its nega-
tive correlation with investment. Clearly, a better ﬁt in this dimension would require
allowing for ﬁnancial frictions also in the household sector.
4 Welfare-based evaluation of alternative policies
Our model features monopolistic competition on the goods markets, so the decentralized
equilibrium is not eﬃcient even in the non-stochastic steady state. Financial frictions
are yet another distortion, acting like a tax on the gross rate of return on capital (see
equation (35)). In principle, the ﬁrst best allocation could be achieved, at least in the
steady state, using appropriately designed subsidies. We assume that such instruments
are not available and focus instead on the problem faced by a benevolent monetary




Table 1. Structural parameters
Parameter Value Description
Households
β 0.994 discount rate
σ 2.0 inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution
κ 160 weight on disutility of labor
ϕ 2.0 inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply
γc 0.3 share of tradables in consumption
α 0.6 home bias (consumption and investment goods)
Capital production and ﬁnancial frictions
τ 0.025 depreciation rate
ςi 5.2 investment adjustment costs
γi 0.6 share of tradables in investment
µ 0.1 monitoring costs
ν 0.977 survival rate for entrepreneurs
σE 0.27 steady-state standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity
Intermediate goods ﬁrms
ηN 0.38 capital share in nontradable production
ηH 0.38 capital share in tradable production
φN 3.50 elasticity of substitution between intermediate nontradable varieties
φH 5.76 elasticity of substitution between intermediate tradable varieties
θN 0.9 Calvo probability for nontradables
θH 0.75 Calvo probability for tradables
Monetary authority
ρ 0.85 interest rate smoothing
φπ 2.00 long-run response to inﬂation
φ∆y 0.15 response to output growth
φ∆π 0.19 response to change in inﬂation
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Table 2. Stochastic processes
Parameter Value Description
Autoregressive coeﬃcients
ρt 0.85 productivity shock in tradable sector
ρn 0.85 productivity shock in nontradable sector
ρd 0.80 consumption preference shock
ρg 0.96 government spending shock
ρi 0.75 investment-speciﬁc technology shock
ρν 0.50 ﬁnancial wealth shock
ρe 0.75 riskiness shock
Standard deviations
σt 0.024 productivity shock in tradable sector
σn 0.019 productivity shock in nontradable sector
σd 0.005 consumption preference shock
σg 0.0045 government spending shock
σi 0.016 investment-speciﬁc technology shock
σν 0.012 ﬁnancial wealth shock
σe 0.04 riskiness shock
σm 0.001 monetary policy shock
Table 3. Steady-state ratios
Variable Value
Consumption share in GDP 58.5
Government expenditures share in GDP 21.0
Investment share in GDP 20.5
Exports share in GDP 12.0
Net exports share in GDP 0.0
Net worth share in capital 50.0
External ﬁnance premium (RE − R, annualized) 1.64
Bankruptcy rate (per quarter) 0.73
Bankruptcy costs share in output 0.27
Share of transfers to entrepreneurs in output 4.1
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Government spending 1.61 1.60
Inﬂation 0.36 0.36
Short-term interest rate 1.16 2.81
Entrepreneurs’ debt 1.41 1.53





Government spending 0.96 0.96
Inﬂation 0.59 0.70
Short-term interest rate 0.93 0.98
Entrepreneurs’ debt 0.51 0.18




Government spending 0.01 -0.21
Inﬂation -0.44 -0.04
Short-term interest rate -0.05 -0.04
Entrepreneurs’ debt 0.13 0.26
Credit spread -0.11 -0.22
Other correlations
Credit spread-investment -0.21 -0.12
Notes: GDP components and entrepreneurs’ debt are ex-
pressed in log diﬀerences.
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Table 5. Variance decomposition
Shock GDP Consump. Investment Inﬂation Interest Entrepr. Credit
rate debt spread
Prod. (T) 26.4 6.8 4.1 24.3 4.5 1.7 3.8
Prod. (NT) 46.9 34.9 1.7 37.9 26.1 5.6 8.8
Preference 5.0 26.6 0.0 0.4 1.5 0.1 0.0
Gov. spending 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.0
Inv. speciﬁc 2.8 0.7 28.4 2.0 11.0 1.8 1.4
Monetary 11.3 8.7 6.0 14.2 1.9 0.4 2.9
Ent. survival 4.0 3.5 46.1 3.4 29.3 89.9 58.8
Ent. riskiness 0.6 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 23.9
Foreign 2.0 17.9 11.6 17.6 24.6 0.4 0.3
Notes: GDP components and entrepreneurs’ debt are expressed in log diﬀerences.
Table 6. Wedges under optimal policy: simple model
with ﬁnancial frictions
Flexible prices Sticky prices
All shocks
mean premium 0.3 1.7
stdev premium 23.4 51.4
stdev PPI 0.8 0.1
Home productivity
mean premium 0.0 1.5
stdev premium 2.5 20.9
stdev PPI 0.7 0.1
Foreign productivity
mean premium 0.0 0.0
stdev premium 2.5 6.4
stdev PPI 0.0 0.0
Notes: The numbers are in basis points (premium) and percentage
points (inﬂation). The mean of the premium is relative to its steady-
state level. The normalization factors for the means are 12.2 (ﬂexible
prices) and 4.2 (sticky prices), while those for the standard deviations
are 3.5 and 2.0, respectively.
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3 Calibration
We calibrate our model to the euro area economy, setting its size in our two-country
world to 0.25. The parameters for the rest of the world are assumed to be identical
to those in the euro area. Our calibration proceeds in two steps. We ﬁrst match
the key steady-state ratios of the euro area and set the other structural parameters
so that they are consistent with the estimated version of the New Area-Wide Model
(NAWM), documented in Christoﬀel, Coenen, and Warne (2008). While parameterizing
the ﬁnancial frictions block, we draw on Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010). In particular, we set the ﬁnancial sector
parameters such that half of capital is ﬁnanced by debt. In the next step, the inertia
and volatility of stochastic disturbances are chosen to match the moments of a standard
set of euro area macroaggregates and two ﬁnancial variables. These are the debt of
the enterprise sector and the spread between interest charged on loans to ﬁrms and
the short-term yield on government bonds. The results of the calibration exercise are
reported in Tables 1 to 4 and the resulting variance decomposition is shown in Table 5.
Tables 1 to 5 about here
Our model replicates the standard deviations of GDP and its main components. It
signiﬁcantly underestimates the volatility of the short-term interest rate and roughly
captures that of inﬂation. As regards our two ﬁnancial variables, there is some trade-oﬀ
in matching the standard deviation of entrepreneurs’ debt and that of credit spreads.
In principle, a better ﬁt could be obtained by increasing the volatility of the survival
shock at the expense of the riskiness shock, but would require signiﬁcant deviations
from the econometric estimates obtained by Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010).
Turning to other moment matching results, our model gets the persistence and
cyclical behaviour of most of the variables of interest more or less right, although the
ﬁt for investment can be seen as disappointing, given the model’s focus on frictions
in ﬁnancing capital expenditures. It is also worth noting that while our model makes
the premium less countercyclical than in the data, it somewhat exaggerates its nega-
tive correlation with investment. Clearly, a better ﬁt in this dimension would require
allowing for ﬁnancial frictions also in the household sector.
4 Welfare-based evaluation of alternative policies
Our model features monopolistic competition on the goods markets, so the decentralized
equilibrium is not eﬃcient even in the non-stochastic steady state. Financial frictions
are yet another distortion, acting like a tax on the gross rate of return on capital (see
equation (35)). In principle, the ﬁrst best allocation could be achieved, at least in the
steady state, using appropriately designed subsidies. We assume that such instruments
are not available and focus instead on the problem faced by a benevolent monetary
policy maker striving to achieve the second best allocation, i.e. the constrained Ramsey
cooperative equilibrium.
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are yet another distortion, acting like a tax on the gross rate of return on capital (see
equation (35)). In principle, the ﬁrst best allocation could be achieved, at least in the
steady state, using appropriately designed subsidies. We assume that such instruments
are not available and focus instead on the problem faced by a benevolent monetary
policy maker striving to achieve the second best allocation, i.e. the constrained Ramsey
cooperative equilibrium.
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The Ramsey cooperative equilibrium can be thought of as an arrangement in which
both central banks agree to implement policies that maximize the weighted average of
a representative household’s welfare of the two regions, with the weights given by the
population size.6 As in Woodford (2003), we consider policies under commitment in a
timeless perspective. Under these restrictions, the cooperative equilibrium benchmark
generates the second best allocation in our two-region world. In principle, there is
no guarantee that this policy maximizes welfare of a representative consumer in each
region. Coenen, Lombardo, Smets, and Straub (2009) show that the Nash equilibrium,
in which each central bank maximizes welfare of its own country taking as given the
other central bank’s action, might yield higher welfare from an individual country’s
perspective so that the gains from cooperation are negative, unless appropriate wealth
transfers are allowed. We leave this more complex analysis of non-cooperative policies
for future research and will refer henceforth to the cooperative equilibrium as optimal.7
In order to build intuition for the optimal policy outcomes, we compare them to
those obtained under simple policy variants. These include various forms of strict
inﬂation targeting. We also consider the case of a full monetary integration, deﬁned as
the same benchmark cooperative equilibrium, except that the exchange rate between
the two regions is ﬁxed.
We assess the welfare implications of the alternative monetary policy strategies by
taking a second-order approximation of all model equations, including the ﬁrst-order
conditions of the welfare maximization problem of the policy maker.8 Such a numerical
approach yields a correct ranking of alternative policies and has been used in many
analyses of optimal policy (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2006; Coenen, Lombardo,
Smets, and Straub, 2009).9
We evaluate each policy by calculating the welfare loss, expressed in terms of the
proportion of each period’s consumption that a typical household in the home economy
would need to give up in a deterministic world so that its welfare is equal to the expected







































where variables without time subscripts denote their respective steady state values and
6The ﬁrst order conditions of the welfare maximization problem of the policy maker(s) are computed
using G. Lombardo’s lq solution routine (see also Coenen, Lombardo, Smets, and Straub, 2009).
7Another problematic feature of the Nash equilibrium is that it depends on the choice of instrument
deﬁning the policy game and on the concept of equilibrium (open loop vs. closed loop).
8The calculations are performed in Dynare 4, which can be downloaded from
http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare.
9An alternative would be to use a linear-quadratic approximation described in Benigno and Wood-
ford (2005), which is a generalization to Rotemberg and Woodford (1998). As discussed by Benigno
and Woodford (2006), a clear advantage of this analytical approach is that it helps to gain insight into
fully optimal policy. However, given the size and complexity of our model, following this way is of
little use, so we opt for a more practical method.
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taking a second-order approximation of all model equations, including the ﬁrst-order
conditions of the welfare maximization problem of the policy maker.8 Such a numerical
approach yields a correct ranking of alternative policies and has been used in many
analyses of optimal policy (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2006; Coenen, Lombardo,
Smets, and Straub, 2009).9
We evaluate each policy by calculating the welfare loss, expressed in terms of the
proportion of each period’s consumption that a typical household in the home economy
would need to give up in a deterministic world so that its welfare is equal to the expected
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little use, so we opt for a more practical method.
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the starting point for the left hand side of (72) is the ergodic mean of the cooperative
equilibrium.
5 Incentives of cooperative policymakers
We have already noted that the external ﬁnance premium is ineﬃcient, so, absent other
frictions, if a speciﬁc subsidy was available to the policymaker, she would eliminate the
ﬁnancial frictions completely by ensuring that the expected rate of return on capital
is equal to the risk free rate at all times. To understand the policymaker’s incentives
in a second best world, and absent such a subsidy, it is instructive to ﬁrst consider a
simpliﬁed version of our model, in which we abstract from the presence of nontradable
goods, home bias or government purchases, so that it becomes a standard two-country
New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and ﬁnancial frictions.
The ﬁrst column in Table 6 shows the mean and standard deviation of the external
ﬁnance premium under optimal policy and ﬂexible prices. It is clear that the cooperative
policymaker does not bring the mean of the premium below its steady state value, even
if shocks are only to productivity. This result is similar to the related well-known
outcome for a simple Calvo model with perfect ﬁnancial markets, according to which
inﬂating the economy to achieve a reduction in the mean markup is suboptimal (see
e.g. King and Wolman, 1999, Woodford, 2003 and Benigno and Woodford, 2006).
Furthermore, although the optimizing policymaker limits ﬂuctuations in the premium,
she does not ﬁnd it optimal to eliminate them completely. To see why, one needs to
note that, from equation (35), complete stabilization of the premium requires constant
leverage. In other words, avoiding ﬂuctuations in the premium implies constraining
capital expenditures to move only in proportion to entrepreneurs’ net worth, which
is a state variable. Thus, the dependence of the premium on the leverage creates a
trade-oﬀ that the policymaker might want to resolve by allowing some ﬂuctuations in
the former.10
Table 6 about here
Another important feature of allocations under optimal policy in the ﬂexible price
case is cross-country premia equalization following asymmetric productivity shocks.
This ﬁnding is related to the international real business cycle literature (e.g. Baxter
and Crucini, 1993), according to which an eﬃcient allocation in a frictionless world
implies equalization of the ex ante rates of return on capital (corrected for the exchange
rate movements) across countries. If ﬁnancial markets are imperfect and households
equally patient in both economies, the UIP condition (56), the external ﬁnance premium
deﬁnition (35) and its foreign counterpart imply the following relationship between
home and foreign rates of return on capital:
10To have a better understanding of this trade-oﬀ, it is instructive to look at the optimal responses of
the economy in which monitoring costs are zero so that changes in leverage do not create any frictions.
Clearly, leverage is not constant in such an environment as it would hamper an optimal response of
the capital stock to macroeconomic shocks.
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Table 5. Variance decomposition
Shock GDP Consump. Investment Inﬂation Interest Entrepr. Credit
rate debt spread
Prod. (T) 26.4 6.8 4.1 24.3 4.5 1.7 3.8
Prod. (NT) 46.9 34.9 1.7 37.9 26.1 5.6 8.8
Preference 5.0 26.6 0.0 0.4 1.5 0.1 0.0
Gov. spending 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.0
Inv. speciﬁc 2.8 0.7 28.4 2.0 11.0 1.8 1.4
Monetary 11.3 8.7 6.0 14.2 1.9 0.4 2.9
Ent. survival 4.0 3.5 46.1 3.4 29.3 89.9 58.8
Ent. riskiness 0.6 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 23.9
Foreign 2.0 17.9 11.6 17.6 24.6 0.4 0.3
Notes: GDP components and entrepreneurs’ debt are expressed in log diﬀerences.
Table 6. Wedges under optimal policy: simple model
with ﬁnancial frictions
Flexible prices Sticky prices
All shocks
mean premium 0.3 1.7
stdev premium 23.4 51.4
stdev PPI 0.8 0.1
Home productivity
mean premium 0.0 1.5
stdev premium 2.5 20.9
stdev PPI 0.7 0.1
Foreign productivity
mean premium 0.0 0.0
stdev premium 2.5 6.4
stdev PPI 0.0 0.0
Notes: The numbers are in basis points (premium) and percentage
points (inﬂation). The mean of the premium is relative to its steady-
state level. The normalization factors for the means are 12.2 (ﬂexible
prices) and 4.2 (sticky prices), while those for the standard deviations
are 3.5 and 2.0, respectively.
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Other things equal, and to ﬁrst order, the cooperative policymaker would have the
incentive to stabilize the premia. By doing so, the cross-country allocation of capital
would coincide to that of a frictionless international real business cycle model. In the
face of other frictions, though, this incentive will be traded oﬀ with other eﬃciency
margins, and, in general, full stabilization will not be achieved.
Now we can discuss the consequences of allowing for stickiness in price setting.
In a simple open economy New Keynesian model with producer currency pricing and
perfect ﬁnancial markets, PPI targeting eliminates price dispersion and so replicates
optimal policy outcomes.11 Introducing ﬁnancial frictions creates a trade-oﬀ between
eliminating price dispersion and following the incentives discussed above. As can be
seen from the second column in Table 6, the optimal policy solves this trade-oﬀ by
departing somewhat from PPI stabilization, allowing more ﬂuctuations in the premia
and breaking their cross-country comovement.
In particular, the premia equalization incentive is in conﬂict with the expenditure
switching motive known from the earlier literature (see e.g. Engel, 2003). Price rigidity
calls for nominal exchange rate adjustments in response to shocks. These adjustments,
though, have an asymmetric eﬀect on CPI in the two countries. As entrepreneurial
debt is nominal, asymmetric inﬂation dynamics will imply asymmetric eﬀects on its
real value, and hence on the external ﬁnance premium. Therefore, this open-economy
channel brings about a new trade-oﬀ for the policymaker. For example, this would be
the case for all those shocks that exert a downward (upward) pressure on the home
external ﬁnance premium that is stronger than that exerted on the foreign premium
and that, at the same time, requires a depreciation (appreciation) of the exchange rate.
The induced relative change in inﬂation, in this case, would widen the gap between
the external ﬁnance premia, bringing the economy further away from the ﬁnancial-
frictionless equilibrium.
The introduction of nontradable goods makes the job of the central bank even
harder. Now a sectoral productivity shock cannot be fully neutralized by an adjustment
of the exchange rate. For example, an exchange rate depreciation engineered to absorb
a domestic tradable productivity shock will generate a misalignment of the relative
price between domestic nontradables and foreign tradables. Now the optimal policy
will have to trade oﬀ relative price adjustments, changes in external ﬁnance premia and
relative adjustments of the latter.
11As shown by Benigno and Benigno (2006), the equivalence of PPI targeting and optimal policy is
exact if either the steady state is eﬃcient or output is equal to consumption. This is not the case in
the simpliﬁed version of our model discussed in this section as it includes steady-state distortions and
investment. However, as we show in the next section, the departures turn out to be negligible, so we
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6 Main results
6.1 Optimal policy in a simple model with capital accumula-
tion
Our main objective is to demonstrate and quantitatively evaluate how the presence
of ﬁnancial frictions changes the optimal policy responses to macroeconomic shocks.
To make our exposition transparent, we start with a standard symmetric two-country
New Keynesian model considered in the previous section, with capital accumulation
and producer currency pricing. In particular, we abstract for now from the presence of
nontradable goods, home bias or government purchases.
Before we move on to the results, one remark is in order. Remember that we calibrate
all parameters (and shock volatilities in particular) using the fully-ﬂedged version of our
model. This means that its simple variants do not necessarily retain a solid empirical
basis if all parameters are kept unchanged. Therefore, in order to facilitate comparisons
across models, we normalize all welfare losses and other moments presented below by
the ratio of the output variance in a given version (under the Taylor rule) to output
variance in the full version of our model.12
Table 7 present the welfare losses (of the home country relative to the optimal
cooperative policy) for a set of simple policies in our benchmark model with perfect or
imperfect ﬁnancial markets. Our results conﬁrm that in the former case PPI targeting
nearly replicates the optimal policy outcomes and so can serve as a useful benchmark.
The losses associated with keeping consumer prices or the exchange rate stable are
non-negligible but do not exceed 0.08% of steady-state consumption. These losses are
almost entirely due to technology disturbances, while the contribution of other shocks
(preference and investment-speciﬁc in this simple model version) is very close to zero.
Table 7 about here
We have already discussed that if ﬁnancial markets are imperfect, PPI targeting is
no longer optimal. The welfare loss associated with this policy amounts to around 0.05%
of steady-state consumption. While this number is about half of the loss of following
a strict CPI-stability policy in the frictionless case, it might still appear rather small.
However, as Table 8 reveals, the consequences of introducing ﬁnancial frictions turn out
to be an order of magnitude larger than those related to other frictions emphasized in the
literature as sources of welfare losses, e.g. home bias (Faia and Monacelli, 2008), habits
(Leith, Moldovan, and Rossi, 2009), nontradable goods (Duarte and Obstfeld, 2008) or
government expenditures (Benigno and Woodford, 2005). Interestingly, the presence
of ﬁnancial frictions makes the monetary union (under optimal policy) relatively more
12This is motivated by the fact that welfare losses, as well as means and variances of the main vari-
ables of interest, are approximately proportional to the variance of stochastic disturbances. Therefore,
our normalization can be thought of as a proportional correction of all shock volatilities so that the
volatility of output in all model versions matches that observed in the data. Since losses and moments
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6 Main results
6.1 Optimal policy in a simple model with capital accumula-
tion
Our main objective is to demonstrate and quantitatively evaluate how the presence
of ﬁnancial frictions changes the optimal policy responses to macroeconomic shocks.
To make our exposition transparent, we start with a standard symmetric two-country
New Keynesian model considered in the previous section, with capital accumulation
and producer currency pricing. In particular, we abstract for now from the presence of
nontradable goods, home bias or government purchases.
Before we move on to the results, one remark is in order. Remember that we calibrate
all parameters (and shock volatilities in particular) using the fully-ﬂedged version of our
model. This means that its simple variants do not necessarily retain a solid empirical
basis if all parameters are kept unchanged. Therefore, in order to facilitate comparisons
across models, we normalize all welfare losses and other moments presented below by
the ratio of the output variance in a given version (under the Taylor rule) to output
variance in the full version of our model.12
Table 7 present the welfare losses (of the home country relative to the optimal
cooperative policy) for a set of simple policies in our benchmark model with perfect or
imperfect ﬁnancial markets. Our results conﬁrm that in the former case PPI targeting
nearly replicates the optimal policy outcomes and so can serve as a useful benchmark.
The losses associated with keeping consumer prices or the exchange rate stable are
non-negligible but do not exceed 0.08% of steady-state consumption. These losses are
almost entirely due to technology disturbances, while the contribution of other shocks
(preference and investment-speciﬁc in this simple model version) is very close to zero.
Table 7 about here
We have already discussed that if ﬁnancial markets are imperfect, PPI targeting is
no longer optimal. The welfare loss associated with this policy amounts to around 0.05%
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attractive, while the opposite holds true for CPI targeting.13
Table 8 about here
To shed more light on the results presented above, we compare the impulse responses
under the cooperative regime to those implied by PPI targeting and the monetary
union. Figure 1 depicts the dynamic responses to a positive productivity shock in
the home economy. The optimal policy clearly deviates from strict stabilization of
producer price inﬂation. As discussed in the previous section, this is for two reasons.
The ﬁrst one is related to an ineﬃcient drop in the external ﬁnance premia in both
countries. This comes about since keeping PPI unchanged after a positive technology
shock requires monetary easing (i.e. a decrease in real interest rates), sparking the
ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect and amplifying the economic expansion. The second reason
is related to asymmetric responses of the premia across the two economies. As discussed
in the literature stressing expenditure switching eﬀects of the exchange rates in the
presence of nominal rigidities and producer-currency pricing, the home currency needs
to depreciate for producer prices to remain stable (see e.g. Engel (2003), Devereux and
Engel (2007) and Sutherland (2006)). This means that, under PPP (i.e. constant real
exchange rate), CPI has to jump at home and go down abroad. Since ﬁnancial contracts
are nominal, real value of debt decreases at home and increases abroad, which opens the
gap between the external ﬁnance premia of the two countries. Overall, the cooperative
policy maker trades oﬀ costly price adjustments with these ineﬃcient changes in the
ﬁnancial premium. As a result, it is optimal to actually tighten the policy on impact (i.e.
design an increase in real interest rates) and limit the exchange rate movements. It has
to be noted, however, that some depreciation is needed for the premia to be equalized.
As can be seen from the responses under the union regime, ﬁxing the exchange rate
results in a premium gap of the opposite sign: there is a drop in the premium abroad
and a slight increase at home. This is because, absent the expenditure switching eﬀect
of the exchange rate, demand for capital in the home country falls even more relative
to that abroad, pushing the rental rate and so the return on capital down.
Figure 1 about here
As in the frictionless case, the welfare implications of other shocks (preference and
investment-speciﬁc shocks, as well as two shocks related to entrepreneurs, i.e. survival
and riskiness) lumped together are much smaller than those of productivity shocks.
It is interesting to note, however, that in this case the ﬁxed exchange rate regime
performs better than strict PPI targeting. This observation applies for any of these
shocks considered individually.
We take a closer look at a negative survival rate shock. This shock can be interpreted
as an exogenous destruction in entrepreneurs’ net worth, which decreases their ability
to borrow. While its welfare implications are not large under our calibration, they may
become very signiﬁcant at times of severe ﬁnancial distress. The dynamic responses
13Strict CPI stability and the monetary union imply a constant nominal exchange rate, when PPP
holds. Foregoing exchange rate volatility, therefore, does not put the policymaker in the monetary
union at a disadvantage relative to the strict CPI-stability case.
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Table 7. Welfare costs: simple model
PPI targ. CPI targ. Mon. union
No ﬁnancial frictions
All shocks 0.000 0.077 0.077
Productivity shocks 0.000 0.076 0.077
Financial frictions
All shocks 0.051 0.101 0.066
Productivity shocks 0.042 0.092 0.064
Notes: All numbers are relative to the cooperative equilibrium.
Welfare losses are expressed in percent of steady-state consump-
tion. The normalization factors (variance of output relative to the
fully-ﬂedged version of the model) are 4.1 (no ﬁnancial frictions)
and 4.2 (ﬁnancial frictions).
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consequences of augmenting the baseline with various frictions (one at
a time). The normalization factors (variance of output relative to the
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3.3 (consumption habits, with persistence 0.57), 1.1 (nontradable goods),
2.5 (government spending) and 4.2 (ﬁnancial frictions).
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exchange rate), CPI has to jump at home and go down abroad. Since ﬁnancial contracts
are nominal, real value of debt decreases at home and increases abroad, which opens the
gap between the external ﬁnance premia of the two countries. Overall, the cooperative
policy maker trades oﬀ costly price adjustments with these ineﬃcient changes in the
ﬁnancial premium. As a result, it is optimal to actually tighten the policy on impact (i.e.
design an increase in real interest rates) and limit the exchange rate movements. It has
to be noted, however, that some depreciation is needed for the premia to be equalized.
As can be seen from the responses under the union regime, ﬁxing the exchange rate
results in a premium gap of the opposite sign: there is a drop in the premium abroad
and a slight increase at home. This is because, absent the expenditure switching eﬀect
of the exchange rate, demand for capital in the home country falls even more relative
to that abroad, pushing the rental rate and so the return on capital down.
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investment-speciﬁc shocks, as well as two shocks related to entrepreneurs, i.e. survival
and riskiness) lumped together are much smaller than those of productivity shocks.
It is interesting to note, however, that in this case the ﬁxed exchange rate regime
performs better than strict PPI targeting. This observation applies for any of these
shocks considered individually.
We take a closer look at a negative survival rate shock. This shock can be interpreted
as an exogenous destruction in entrepreneurs’ net worth, which decreases their ability
to borrow. While its welfare implications are not large under our calibration, they may
become very signiﬁcant at times of severe ﬁnancial distress. The dynamic responses
13Strict CPI stability and the monetary union imply a constant nominal exchange rate, when PPP
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As can be seen from the responses under the union regime, ﬁxing the exchange rate
results in a premium gap of the opposite sign: there is a drop in the premium abroad
and a slight increase at home. This is because, absent the expenditure switching eﬀect
of the exchange rate, demand for capital in the home country falls even more relative
to that abroad, pushing the rental rate and so the return on capital down.
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As in the frictionless case, the welfare implications of other shocks (preference and
investment-speciﬁc shocks, as well as two shocks related to entrepreneurs, i.e. survival
and riskiness) lumped together are much smaller than those of productivity shocks.
It is interesting to note, however, that in this case the ﬁxed exchange rate regime
performs better than strict PPI targeting. This observation applies for any of these
shocks considered individually.
We take a closer look at a negative survival rate shock. This shock can be interpreted
as an exogenous destruction in entrepreneurs’ net worth, which decreases their ability
to borrow. While its welfare implications are not large under our calibration, they may
become very signiﬁcant at times of severe ﬁnancial distress. The dynamic responses
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are shown in Figure 2. By raising the external ﬁnancing premium, this shock acts like
a cost-push shock, so keeping prices stable requires monetary tightening (see the PPI
case). The optimal response tries to strike a balance between the negative eﬀects of
price dispersion and an excessive increase in the external ﬁnancing premium.14 As a
result, a benevolent central bank tries to oﬀset some of net worth destruction resulting
from the shock with an initial easing of the monetary policy, which allows to dampen
the response in the premium at the expense of a rise in inﬂation and large swings in the
nominal exchange rate. If both countries agree to ﬁx their exchange rate, they come
closer to the optimum than under PPI targeting. The reason is that the union case
allows for some increase in inﬂation and a short-run expansion in output, which helps
to limit an increase in the premium.
Figure 2 about here
While the general prescriptions for the optimal policy facing ﬁnancial frictions and
net worth shocks developed above are broadly consistent with the analysis of Carlstrom,
Fuerst, and Paustian (2010) in a model without capital accumulation, one remark is
in order. In their model, optimal policy is expansionary in response to a negative net
worth shock in terms of cumulative real rates, but they actually increase on impact only
to decline below levels implied by price stability, so the initial rise of the risk premium
is higher under optimal policy. This results in a rather counter-intuitive conclusion
that introducing risk premia will lead the central bank to magnify their movements
compared to the strict inﬂation targeting regime. The authors conjecture that a more
elaborate model, featuring demand-side eﬀects via endogenous capital accumulation,
would preserve this result. In contrast, our model implies that the initial response of
optimizing policy makers to net worth destruction will be expansionary. Arguably a
more realistic result.
6.2 Debt denomination
In the simple model considered so far, the two economies were perfectly symmetric. In
this section we revisit the case when the home country’s entrepreneurial debt is denom-
inated in the foreign country’s currency. We will refer to this case as debt euroization.
We start by noting that debt denomination is inconsequential for allocations under
optimal policy if prices are fully ﬂexible. This is because the central banks can still
achieve the desired redistribution of wealth between households and entrepreneurs by
aﬀecting inﬂation in both economies at no cost in terms of price dispersion. In partic-
ular, the optimal response to asymmetric productivity shocks will imply cross-country
equalization of the external ﬁnance premia. In contrast, debt euroization modiﬁes the
policy trade-oﬀs if prices are sticky.
The welfare implications of foreign currency denomination under sticky prices are
summarized in Table 9. The most striking result is that, if domestic entrepreneurs’
14Even if prices were ﬂexible, the optimizing policy maker would not try to stabilize the premium
completely as it would require her to generate inﬂation decreasing the real value of entrepreneurs’
debt, but also of households’ deposits. However, the optimal increase of the premium in the ﬂexible
price case is smaller than that in the presence of nominal rigidities.
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nominal exchange rate. If both countries agree to ﬁx their exchange rate, they come
closer to the optimum than under PPI targeting. The reason is that the union case
allows for some increase in inﬂation and a short-run expansion in output, which helps
to limit an increase in the premium.
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While the general prescriptions for the optimal policy facing ﬁnancial frictions and
net worth shocks developed above are broadly consistent with the analysis of Carlstrom,
Fuerst, and Paustian (2010) in a model without capital accumulation, one remark is
in order. In their model, optimal policy is expansionary in response to a negative net
worth shock in terms of cumulative real rates, but they actually increase on impact only
to decline below levels implied by price stability, so the initial rise of the risk premium
is higher under optimal policy. This results in a rather counter-intuitive conclusion
that introducing risk premia will lead the central bank to magnify their movements
compared to the strict inﬂation targeting regime. The authors conjecture that a more
elaborate model, featuring demand-side eﬀects via endogenous capital accumulation,
would preserve this result. In contrast, our model implies that the initial response of
optimizing policy makers to net worth destruction will be expansionary. Arguably a
more realistic result.
6.2 Debt denomination
In the simple model considered so far, the two economies were perfectly symmetric. In
this section we revisit the case when the home country’s entrepreneurial debt is denom-
inated in the foreign country’s currency. We will refer to this case as debt euroization.
We start by noting that debt denomination is inconsequential for allocations under
optimal policy if prices are fully ﬂexible. This is because the central banks can still
achieve the desired redistribution of wealth between households and entrepreneurs by
aﬀecting inﬂation in both economies at no cost in terms of price dispersion. In partic-
ular, the optimal response to asymmetric productivity shocks will imply cross-country
equalization of the external ﬁnance premia. In contrast, debt euroization modiﬁes the
policy trade-oﬀs if prices are sticky.
The welfare implications of foreign currency denomination under sticky prices are
summarized in Table 9. The most striking result is that, if domestic entrepreneurs’
14Even if prices were ﬂexible, the optimizing policy maker would not try to stabilize the premium
completely as it would require her to generate inﬂation decreasing the real value of entrepreneurs’
debt, but also of households’ deposits. However, the optimal increase of the premium in the ﬂexible
price case is smaller than that in the presence of nominal rigidities.
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debt is denominated in the foreign currency, PPI targeting nearly replicates the opti-
mal response to home productivity shocks, while the other regimes somewhat lose in
attractiveness. In contrast, strict producer price inﬂation stabilization performs sig-
niﬁcantly worse than CPI targeting, and even more so compared to the union case,
if productivity shocks originate abroad. Therefore, if productivity shocks abroad are
on average suﬃciently larger than at home, then the euroized economy may ﬁnd itself
better-oﬀ having the exchange rate ﬁxed rather than pursuing strict PPI targeting. On
balance, if productivity volatility is equal in both economies, the welfare ranking of
alternative regimes remains intact compared to the non-euroized case.
Table 9 about here
These results can be explained as follows. If home entrepreneurs’ debt is denom-
inated in the foreign currency, exchange rate movements aﬀect directly their balance
sheets. Depending on shocks and the policy response, this additional channel either
dampens or ampliﬁes the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect in the euroized economy, and hence
aﬀects the actions taken by the optimizing central bank. This is conﬁrmed by the im-
pulse responses to a home productivity shock presented in Figure 3, where we also
replicate the union case, identical to that presented in Figure 1, for convenience. Re-
member that in the non-euroized case the policy maker deviated from perfect PPI
stabilization, ﬁnding it optimal to tighten on impact and dampen the response of the
exchange rate. If debt is euroized, however, the exchange rate depreciation actually
helps to achieve the central bank objectives, which is preventing excessive and asym-
metric movements in the external ﬁnance premia. This is because a deterioration in
home entrepreneurs’ balance sheets dampens the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect, and much
more so at home than abroad. As a result, the optimal policy no longer needs to tighten
but rather lets the real interest rates fall, like under PPI targeting. The achieved drop
in the premium at home is about four times smaller than in the non-euroized case and
diﬀers very little from that abroad. By construct, this channel does not operate if the
exchange rate is ﬁxed, so the responses under monetary union are the same in the eu-
roized and non-euroized cases. As they imply initial tightening rather than easing, the
allocations under this regime are now further away from the optimum.
Figure 3 about here
An analogous reasoning can be used to analyze the optimal policy when debt is
denominated in the foreign currency and productivity shocks originate abroad (see
Figure 4). In this case, keeping PPI stable implies appreciation of the exchange rate,
which ampliﬁes the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect at home. To prevent an excessive drop
in both countries’ premium, the monetary policy now needs to be tightened much more
than in the non-euroized case. This implies a substantial deviation from PPI targeting.
With our parametrization, this eﬀect is strong enough to make the ﬁxed exchange rate
a relatively more attractive option.
Figure 4 about here
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Table 9. Welfare costs: the role of debt denomination
PPI targ. CPI targ. Mon. union
Domestic currency debt denomination
All shocks 0.051 0.101 0.066
Productivity (H) 0.025 0.044 0.031
Productivity (F) 0.018 0.048 0.033
Foreign currency debt denomination
All shocks 0.061 0.105 0.071
Productivity (H) 0.000 0.055 0.041
Productivity (F) 0.055 0.044 0.029
Notes: All numbers are relative to the cooperative equilibrium. Wel-
fare losses are expressed in percent of steady-state consumption. The
normalization factor is 4.2 (both for domestic and foreign currency
denomination).
Table 10. Welfare costs: the role of nontradables
PPI CPI Mon. ntPPI
targ. targ. union targ.
No ﬁnancial frictions
All shocks 0.003 0.068 0.124 0.042
Trad. productivity (H) 0.004 0.012 0.017 0.007
Nontrad. productivity (H) 0.003 0.019 0.044 0.004
Trad. productivity (F) -0.002 0.030 0.037 0.020
Nontrad. productivity (F) -0.001 0.006 0.025 0.012
Domestic currency debt denomination
All shocks 0.095 0.131 0.141 0.130
Trad. productivity (H) 0.042 0.018 0.015 0.008
Nontrad. productivity (H) 0.008 0.018 0.048 0.044
Trad. productivity (F) 0.005 0.039 0.032 0.013
Nontrad. productivity (F) 0.004 0.019 0.031 0.029
Foreign currency debt denomination
All shocks 0.117 0.130 0.131 0.158
Trad. productivity (H) 0.003 0.021 0.019 0.008
Nontrad. productivity (H) 0.005 0.021 0.052 0.003
Trad. productivity (F) 0.047 0.040 0.030 0.022
Nontrad. productivity (F) 0.036 0.023 0.025 0.101
Notes: All numbers are relative to the cooperative equilibrium.
Welfare losses are expressed in percent of steady-state consumption.
The normalization factor is 1.1 for all model variants.
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More generally, the policy ranking obtained in the euroized case for foreign produc-
tivity shocks depends on the extent of ﬁnancial market imperfections and the size of
leverage. If ﬁnancial frictions are substantial and entrepreneurs run suﬃciently high
debt denominated in the foreign currency, the balance sheet eﬀects related to exchange
rate movements are important and the ﬁxed exchange rate regime yields higher welfare
than PPI targeting. If on the other hand ﬁnancial markets are close to perfect and
leverage is small, stabilizing PPI inﬂation may be preferred.
6.3 Nontradable production
In this section we study the interaction between ﬁnancial frictions and nontradable
goods. A large literature has emphasized the importance of nontradables in explaining
empirical regularities in open economies (e.g. Stockman and Tesar, 1995) and real
exchange rate volatility in particular (e.g. Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo, 2003; Burstein,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2006; Dotsey and Duarte, 2008). As shown for example by
Duarte and Obstfeld (2008) and Faia and Monacelli (2008), real exchange rate volatility
has also strong implications for monetary policy. In light of these results we investigate
whether introducing non-traded goods, alongside ﬁnancial frictions, can generate sizable
eﬀects. To this eﬀect, we extend the model to include non-traded goods in consumption
and investment (see the baseline calibration).
It is important to realize ﬁrst that in such an environment the cooperative policy
maker will not always ﬁnd it optimal to design cross-country equalization of the external
ﬁnance premia in response to productivity shocks, even if prices are fully ﬂexible. To see
why, it is instructive to examine the link between the internal exchange rates and the
real exchange rate. Let us consider an improvement in nontradable sector productivity,
for which an eﬃcient switch in demand requires the relative price of tradables to go up.
However, as it is clear from equation (57), if the shock is asymmetric, the real exchange
rate has to adjust. This ampliﬁes the boom in the country hit, driving the premia apart.
It turns out that the incentive to equalize the premia is far weaker than the incentive
to allow for eﬃcient moves in the real exchange rate: the optimal policy allows only
marginally smaller real exchange rate volatility compared to perfect PPI stabilization.15
In contrast, the motive to dampen the overall premia movements remains important
also after allowing for nontradable production.
Now we revert to the sticky price environment. As before, we start with discussing
the welfare implications of alternative monetary regimes, among which we also include
nontradable PPI targeting. The results are reported in Table 10.
Table 10 about here
Our ﬁndings for a model with perfect capital markets are consistent with the pre-
vious literature. In particular, PPI targeting no longer replicates the optimal policy,
15With symmetric preferences, the internal exchange rates in both economies change by the same
proportion under the optimal policy and tradable sector shocks. As a result, the real exchange rate is
constant and the external ﬁnance premia equalization is satisﬁed.
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However, as it is clear from equation (57), if the shock is asymmetric, the real exchange
rate has to adjust. This ampliﬁes the boom in the country hit, driving the premia apart.
It turns out that the incentive to equalize the premia is far weaker than the incentive
to allow for eﬃcient moves in the real exchange rate: the optimal policy allows only
marginally smaller real exchange rate volatility compared to perfect PPI stabilization.15
In contrast, the motive to dampen the overall premia movements remains important
also after allowing for nontradable production.
Now we revert to the sticky price environment. As before, we start with discussing
the welfare implications of alternative monetary regimes, among which we also include
nontradable PPI targeting. The results are reported in Table 10.
Table 10 about here
Our ﬁndings for a model with perfect capital markets are consistent with the pre-
vious literature. In particular, PPI targeting no longer replicates the optimal policy,
15With symmetric preferences, the internal exchange rates in both economies change by the same
proportion under the optimal policy and tradable sector shocks. As a result, the real exchange rate is
constant and the external ﬁnance premia equalization is satisﬁed.
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even though the losses are small in practice.16 Also, in line with Duarte and Obstfeld
(2008), the presence of nontradable goods clearly strengthens the case for exchange rate
ﬂexibility.
Adding ﬁnancial frictions makes the losses from PPI targeting non-negligible. This
eﬀect is substantially stronger than in a model where all goods are tradable. Taking a
closer look at the decomposition of welfare losses by shocks when entrepreneurs’ debt
is denominated in the domestic currency, at least one observation warrants a comment.
Contrary to the model without nontradables, PPI targeting performs slightly worse
than CPI targeting and substantially worse than the monetary union in response to
productivity shocks originating in the domestic tradable sector. However, in this very
case, it is actually targeting PPI in the nontradable sector that comes closest to the
optimal policy.
To shed some light on why the policy ranking changes if we allow for nontradable
production, we use the impulse response analysis. Figure 5 shows the dynamic responses
to a home tradable sector productivity shock under various regimes. The outcomes
under optimal policy are qualitatively very similar to those obtained in the fully tradable
version of our model presented in Figure 1. The optimal cooperative policy tries to
dampen the boom fueled by the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism, as compared to strict
PPI targeting. Importantly, however, the diﬀerence between these two policies is now
more pronounced in relative terms. In particular, the optimal policy designs nearly twice
lower depreciation and a three times lower decrease in the external ﬁnance premium
than perfect PPI stabilization. The reason why PPI targeting overexpands relatively
more than we have seen in our simple model with tradable goods only is that the
presence of a nontradable sector makes stabilizing the overall producer price inﬂation
more diﬃcult. This is because nontradable goods prices are less ﬂexible, which follows
from our calibration (see Table 1), but mainly from the fact that they are insulated
from direct eﬀects of exchange rate movements.17 As a result, keeping PPI constant
now requires more policy easing (in relative terms, i.e. after correcting for the fact that
an increase in productivity aﬀects only one sector of the economy), the side eﬀect of
which is an excessive decrease in the external ﬁnancing premia.
As in the fully tradable case, if the exchange rate is not allowed to depreciate,
the economic expansion is too weak at home and excessive abroad. However, as the
presence of nontradables makes the expenditure switching eﬀect of nominal exchange
rate movements less important, the union regime now deviates from the optimal policy
by less than PPI targeting and hence ranks better. Finally, the simple rule that comes
closest to optimal is targeting nontradable goods prices. It completely eliminates price
dispersion in the nontradable sector and lets the average level of producer prices drop.
Hence, it does not require as much easing as PPI targeting and so leads to a boom
that is only slightly excessive. Naturally, the ranking of regimes established above
16Interestingly, if productivity shocks originate abroad, PPI targeting yields marginally higher wel-
fare for the home economy than the cooperative equilibrium. This means that implementing the
cooperative policy might be problematic in practice, as it would require cross-country transfers.
17If the Calvo probabilities in the tradable and nontradable sectors are equal, monetary union still
generates higher welfare in response to a home tradable sector productivity shock than PPI targeting.
Naturally, the diﬀerence between the performance of these two regimes is then much smaller.
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More generally, the policy ranking obtained in the euroized case for foreign produc-
tivity shocks depends on the extent of ﬁnancial market imperfections and the size of
leverage. If ﬁnancial frictions are substantial and entrepreneurs run suﬃciently high
debt denominated in the foreign currency, the balance sheet eﬀects related to exchange
rate movements are important and the ﬁxed exchange rate regime yields higher welfare
than PPI targeting. If on the other hand ﬁnancial markets are close to perfect and
leverage is small, stabilizing PPI inﬂation may be preferred.
6.3 Nontradable production
In this section we study the interaction between ﬁnancial frictions and nontradable
goods. A large literature has emphasized the importance of nontradables in explaining
empirical regularities in open economies (e.g. Stockman and Tesar, 1995) and real
exchange rate volatility in particular (e.g. Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo, 2003; Burstein,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2006; Dotsey and Duarte, 2008). As shown for example by
Duarte and Obstfeld (2008) and Faia and Monacelli (2008), real exchange rate volatility
has also strong implications for monetary policy. In light of these results we investigate
whether introducing non-traded goods, alongside ﬁnancial frictions, can generate sizable
eﬀects. To this eﬀect, we extend the model to include non-traded goods in consumption
and investment (see the baseline calibration).
It is important to realize ﬁrst that in such an environment the cooperative policy
maker will not always ﬁnd it optimal to design cross-country equalization of the external
ﬁnance premia in response to productivity shocks, even if prices are fully ﬂexible. To see
why, it is instructive to examine the link between the internal exchange rates and the
real exchange rate. Let us consider an improvement in nontradable sector productivity,
for which an eﬃcient switch in demand requires the relative price of tradables to go up.
However, as it is clear from equation (57), if the shock is asymmetric, the real exchange
rate has to adjust. This ampliﬁes the boom in the country hit, driving the premia apart.
It turns out that the incentive to equalize the premia is far weaker than the incentive
to allow for eﬃcient moves in the real exchange rate: the optimal policy allows only
marginally smaller real exchange rate volatility compared to perfect PPI stabilization.15
In contrast, the motive to dampen the overall premia movements remains important
also after allowing for nontradable production.
Now we revert to the sticky price environment. As before, we start with discussing
the welfare implications of alternative monetary regimes, among which we also include
nontradable PPI targeting. The results are reported in Table 10.
Table 10 about here
Our ﬁndings for a model with perfect capital markets are consistent with the pre-
vious literature. In particular, PPI targeting no longer replicates the optimal policy,
15With symmetric preferences, the internal exchange rates in both economies change by the same
proportion under the optimal policy and tradable sector shocks. As a result, the real exchange rate is
constant and the external ﬁnance premia equalization is satisﬁed.
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Table 9. Welfare costs: the role of debt denomination
PPI targ. CPI targ. Mon. union
Domestic currency debt denomination
All shocks 0.051 0.101 0.066
Productivity (H) 0.025 0.044 0.031
Productivity (F) 0.018 0.048 0.033
Foreign currency debt denomination
All shocks 0.061 0.105 0.071
Productivity (H) 0.000 0.055 0.041
Productivity (F) 0.055 0.044 0.029
Notes: All numbers are relative to the cooperative equilibrium. Wel-
fare losses are expressed in percent of steady-state consumption. The
normalization factor is 4.2 (both for domestic and foreign currency
denomination).
Table 10. Welfare costs: the role of nontradables
PPI CPI Mon. ntPPI
targ. targ. union targ.
No ﬁnancial frictions
All shocks 0.003 0.068 0.124 0.042
Trad. productivity (H) 0.004 0.012 0.017 0.007
Nontrad. productivity (H) 0.003 0.019 0.044 0.004
Trad. productivity (F) -0.002 0.030 0.037 0.020
Nontrad. productivity (F) -0.001 0.006 0.025 0.012
Domestic currency debt denomination
All shocks 0.095 0.131 0.141 0.130
Trad. productivity (H) 0.042 0.018 0.015 0.008
Nontrad. productivity (H) 0.008 0.018 0.048 0.044
Trad. productivity (F) 0.005 0.039 0.032 0.013
Nontrad. productivity (F) 0.004 0.019 0.031 0.029
Foreign currency debt denomination
All shocks 0.117 0.130 0.131 0.158
Trad. productivity (H) 0.003 0.021 0.019 0.008
Nontrad. productivity (H) 0.005 0.021 0.052 0.003
Trad. productivity (F) 0.047 0.040 0.030 0.022
Nontrad. productivity (F) 0.036 0.023 0.025 0.101
Notes: All numbers are relative to the cooperative equilibrium.
Welfare losses are expressed in percent of steady-state consumption.
The normalization factor is 1.1 for all model variants.
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even though the losses are small in practice.16 Also, in line with Duarte and Obstfeld
(2008), the presence of nontradable goods clearly strengthens the case for exchange rate
ﬂexibility.
Adding ﬁnancial frictions makes the losses from PPI targeting non-negligible. This
eﬀect is substantially stronger than in a model where all goods are tradable. Taking a
closer look at the decomposition of welfare losses by shocks when entrepreneurs’ debt
is denominated in the domestic currency, at least one observation warrants a comment.
Contrary to the model without nontradables, PPI targeting performs slightly worse
than CPI targeting and substantially worse than the monetary union in response to
productivity shocks originating in the domestic tradable sector. However, in this very
case, it is actually targeting PPI in the nontradable sector that comes closest to the
optimal policy.
To shed some light on why the policy ranking changes if we allow for nontradable
production, we use the impulse response analysis. Figure 5 shows the dynamic responses
to a home tradable sector productivity shock under various regimes. The outcomes
under optimal policy are qualitatively very similar to those obtained in the fully tradable
version of our model presented in Figure 1. The optimal cooperative policy tries to
dampen the boom fueled by the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism, as compared to strict
PPI targeting. Importantly, however, the diﬀerence between these two policies is now
more pronounced in relative terms. In particular, the optimal policy designs nearly twice
lower depreciation and a three times lower decrease in the external ﬁnance premium
than perfect PPI stabilization. The reason why PPI targeting overexpands relatively
more than we have seen in our simple model with tradable goods only is that the
presence of a nontradable sector makes stabilizing the overall producer price inﬂation
more diﬃcult. This is because nontradable goods prices are less ﬂexible, which follows
from our calibration (see Table 1), but mainly from the fact that they are insulated
from direct eﬀects of exchange rate movements.17 As a result, keeping PPI constant
now requires more policy easing (in relative terms, i.e. after correcting for the fact that
an increase in productivity aﬀects only one sector of the economy), the side eﬀect of
which is an excessive decrease in the external ﬁnancing premia.
As in the fully tradable case, if the exchange rate is not allowed to depreciate,
the economic expansion is too weak at home and excessive abroad. However, as the
presence of nontradables makes the expenditure switching eﬀect of nominal exchange
rate movements less important, the union regime now deviates from the optimal policy
by less than PPI targeting and hence ranks better. Finally, the simple rule that comes
closest to optimal is targeting nontradable goods prices. It completely eliminates price
dispersion in the nontradable sector and lets the average level of producer prices drop.
Hence, it does not require as much easing as PPI targeting and so leads to a boom
that is only slightly excessive. Naturally, the ranking of regimes established above
16Interestingly, if productivity shocks originate abroad, PPI targeting yields marginally higher wel-
fare for the home economy than the cooperative equilibrium. This means that implementing the
cooperative policy might be problematic in practice, as it would require cross-country transfers.
17If the Calvo probabilities in the tradable and nontradable sectors are equal, monetary union still
generates higher welfare in response to a home tradable sector productivity shock than PPI targeting.
Naturally, the diﬀerence between the performance of these two regimes is then much smaller.
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remains valid in the model with nontradable production as long as the share of the
latter in output is suﬃciently large. As our experiments show, however, the union case
dominates PPI targeting in response to domestic tradable productivity shocks already
when the share of nontradables is around 10%, so our ﬁnding about the change in the
policy ranking can be treated as robust.
Figure 5 about here
As one can see from Table 10, if some goods are nontradable and domestic en-
trepreneurs’ debt is denominated in the foreign currency, our results are qualitatively
similar to those obtained for the fully tradable and euroized case presented in Table
9. In particular, PPI targeting performs closest to optimal in response to domestic
tradable sector productivity shocks. This means that the presence of nontradables is
not enough to oﬀset the stabilizing eﬀect of euroized liabilities discussed in the previous
section. In principle, this result depends on the size of the nontradable sector. We ﬁnd,
however, that the ﬁxed exchange rate regime yields higher welfare than PPI targeting in
response to domestic tradable sector productivity disturbances in a euroized economy
only if the share of nontradable production in total output is at least 80%, which is
more than observed in the data (Lombardo and Ravenna, 2009)
Finally, we note that, as in the model with tradables only, if shocks originate in
the tradable sector abroad, PPI targeting performs worse than CPI targeting and the
union. However, these two rules are beaten by nontradable goods inﬂation stabilization.
More generally, while targeting nontradable sector prices seems to be an attractive
alternative to stabilizing the weighted average of inﬂation in both sectors whenever the
latter policy performs worse than the union case, it is not so in general. Taking all
shocks into account, targeting PPI in the nontradable sector is inferior to total PPI
targeting.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed and quantiﬁed how frictions in ﬁnancing capital ex-
penditures aﬀect the optimal monetary policy conduct in a two-country DSGE setup.
Consistently with the earlier literature using more simple and closed-economy models,
we ﬁnd that ﬁnancial market imperfections generate a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and
external ﬁnancing premium stabilization, making strict inﬂation targeting suboptimal.
We show, however, that the welfare implications of this trade-oﬀ are non-negligible. In
particular, ﬁnancial frictions substantially magnify the incentives to deviate from price
stability if we allow for nontradable goods.
In contrast, ﬁnancial market imperfections considered in our paper do not have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the performance of the monetary union. This means that the pres-
ence of ﬁnancial frictions strengthens the case for such an arrangement if cooperation
between countries under ﬂexible exchange rate regimes is diﬃcult to implement.
There is a number of potentially fruitful future research directions, of which we
will name only two. First, it might be interesting to revisit the literature on interna-
tional monetary policy cooperation. According to our preliminary (and not reported)
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even though the losses are small in practice.16 Also, in line with Duarte and Obstfeld
(2008), the presence of nontradable goods clearly strengthens the case for exchange rate
ﬂexibility.
Adding ﬁnancial frictions makes the losses from PPI targeting non-negligible. This
eﬀect is substantially stronger than in a model where all goods are tradable. Taking a
closer look at the decomposition of welfare losses by shocks when entrepreneurs’ debt
is denominated in the domestic currency, at least one observation warrants a comment.
Contrary to the model without nontradables, PPI targeting performs slightly worse
than CPI targeting and substantially worse than the monetary union in response to
productivity shocks originating in the domestic tradable sector. However, in this very
case, it is actually targeting PPI in the nontradable sector that comes closest to the
optimal policy.
To shed some light on why the policy ranking changes if we allow for nontradable
production, we use the impulse response analysis. Figure 5 shows the dynamic responses
to a home tradable sector productivity shock under various regimes. The outcomes
under optimal policy are qualitatively very similar to those obtained in the fully tradable
version of our model presented in Figure 1. The optimal cooperative policy tries to
dampen the boom fueled by the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism, as compared to strict
PPI targeting. Importantly, however, the diﬀerence between these two policies is now
more pronounced in relative terms. In particular, the optimal policy designs nearly twice
lower depreciation and a three times lower decrease in the external ﬁnance premium
than perfect PPI stabilization. The reason why PPI targeting overexpands relatively
more than we have seen in our simple model with tradable goods only is that the
presence of a nontradable sector makes stabilizing the overall producer price inﬂation
more diﬃcult. This is because nontradable goods prices are less ﬂexible, which follows
from our calibration (see Table 1), but mainly from the fact that they are insulated
from direct eﬀects of exchange rate movements.17 As a result, keeping PPI constant
now requires more policy easing (in relative terms, i.e. after correcting for the fact that
an increase in productivity aﬀects only one sector of the economy), the side eﬀect of
which is an excessive decrease in the external ﬁnancing premia.
As in the fully tradable case, if the exchange rate is not allowed to depreciate,
the economic expansion is too weak at home and excessive abroad. However, as the
presence of nontradables makes the expenditure switching eﬀect of nominal exchange
rate movements less important, the union regime now deviates from the optimal policy
by less than PPI targeting and hence ranks better. Finally, the simple rule that comes
closest to optimal is targeting nontradable goods prices. It completely eliminates price
dispersion in the nontradable sector and lets the average level of producer prices drop.
Hence, it does not require as much easing as PPI targeting and so leads to a boom
that is only slightly excessive. Naturally, the ranking of regimes established above
16Interestingly, if productivity shocks originate abroad, PPI targeting yields marginally higher wel-
fare for the home economy than the cooperative equilibrium. This means that implementing the
cooperative policy might be problematic in practice, as it would require cross-country transfers.
17If the Calvo probabilities in the tradable and nontradable sectors are equal, monetary union still
generates higher welfare in response to a home tradable sector productivity shock than PPI targeting.
Naturally, the diﬀerence between the performance of these two regimes is then much smaller.
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remains valid in the model with nontradable production as long as the share of the
latter in output is suﬃciently large. As our experiments show, however, the union case
dominates PPI targeting in response to domestic tradable productivity shocks already
when the share of nontradables is around 10%, so our ﬁnding about the change in the
policy ranking can be treated as robust.
Figure 5 about here
As one can see from Table 10, if some goods are nontradable and domestic en-
trepreneurs’ debt is denominated in the foreign currency, our results are qualitatively
similar to those obtained for the fully tradable and euroized case presented in Table
9. In particular, PPI targeting performs closest to optimal in response to domestic
tradable sector productivity shocks. This means that the presence of nontradables is
not enough to oﬀset the stabilizing eﬀect of euroized liabilities discussed in the previous
section. In principle, this result depends on the size of the nontradable sector. We ﬁnd,
however, that the ﬁxed exchange rate regime yields higher welfare than PPI targeting in
response to domestic tradable sector productivity disturbances in a euroized economy
only if the share of nontradable production in total output is at least 80%, which is
more than observed in the data (Lombardo and Ravenna, 2009)
Finally, we note that, as in the model with tradables only, if shocks originate in
the tradable sector abroad, PPI targeting performs worse than CPI targeting and the
union. However, these two rules are beaten by nontradable goods inﬂation stabilization.
More generally, while targeting nontradable sector prices seems to be an attractive
alternative to stabilizing the weighted average of inﬂation in both sectors whenever the
latter policy performs worse than the union case, it is not so in general. Taking all
shocks into account, targeting PPI in the nontradable sector is inferior to total PPI
targeting.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed and quantiﬁed how frictions in ﬁnancing capital ex-
penditures aﬀect the optimal monetary policy conduct in a two-country DSGE setup.
Consistently with the earlier literature using more simple and closed-economy models,
we ﬁnd that ﬁnancial market imperfections generate a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and
external ﬁnancing premium stabilization, making strict inﬂation targeting suboptimal.
We show, however, that the welfare implications of this trade-oﬀ are non-negligible. In
particular, ﬁnancial frictions substantially magnify the incentives to deviate from price
stability if we allow for nontradable goods.
In contrast, ﬁnancial market imperfections considered in our paper do not have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the performance of the monetary union. This means that the pres-
ence of ﬁnancial frictions strengthens the case for such an arrangement if cooperation
between countries under ﬂexible exchange rate regimes is diﬃcult to implement.
There is a number of potentially fruitful future research directions, of which we
will name only two. First, it might be interesting to revisit the literature on interna-
tional monetary policy cooperation. According to our preliminary (and not reported)
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remains valid in the model with nontradable production as long as the share of the
latter in output is suﬃciently large. As our experiments show, however, the union case
dominates PPI targeting in response to domestic tradable productivity shocks already
when the share of nontradables is around 10%, so our ﬁnding about the change in the
policy ranking can be treated as robust.
Figure 5 about here
As one can see from Table 10, if some goods are nontradable and domestic en-
trepreneurs’ debt is denominated in the foreign currency, our results are qualitatively
similar to those obtained for the fully tradable and euroized case presented in Table
9. In particular, PPI targeting performs closest to optimal in response to domestic
tradable sector productivity shocks. This means that the presence of nontradables is
not enough to oﬀset the stabilizing eﬀect of euroized liabilities discussed in the previous
section. In principle, this result depends on the size of the nontradable sector. We ﬁnd,
however, that the ﬁxed exchange rate regime yields higher welfare than PPI targeting in
response to domestic tradable sector productivity disturbances in a euroized economy
only if the share of nontradable production in total output is at least 80%, which is
more than observed in the data (Lombardo and Ravenna, 2009)
Finally, we note that, as in the model with tradables only, if shocks originate in
the tradable sector abroad, PPI targeting performs worse than CPI targeting and the
union. However, these two rules are beaten by nontradable goods inﬂation stabilization.
More generally, while targeting nontradable sector prices seems to be an attractive
alternative to stabilizing the weighted average of inﬂation in both sectors whenever the
latter policy performs worse than the union case, it is not so in general. Taking all
shocks into account, targeting PPI in the nontradable sector is inferior to total PPI
targeting.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed and quantiﬁed how frictions in ﬁnancing capital ex-
penditures aﬀect the optimal monetary policy conduct in a two-country DSGE setup.
Consistently with the earlier literature using more simple and closed-economy models,
we ﬁnd that ﬁnancial market imperfections generate a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and
external ﬁnancing premium stabilization, making strict inﬂation targeting suboptimal.
We show, however, that the welfare implications of this trade-oﬀ are non-negligible. In
particular, ﬁnancial frictions substantially magnify the incentives to deviate from price
stability if we allow for nontradable goods.
In contrast, ﬁnancial market imperfections considered in our paper do not have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the performance of the monetary union. This means that the pres-
ence of ﬁnancial frictions strengthens the case for such an arrangement if cooperation
between countries under ﬂexible exchange rate regimes is diﬃcult to implement.
There is a number of potentially fruitful future research directions, of which we
will name only two. First, it might be interesting to revisit the literature on interna-
tional monetary policy cooperation. According to our preliminary (and not reported)
31
calculations, gains from cooperation after introducing ﬁnancial frictions remain small,
especially if mark-up shocks are absent. However, this may change if one allows for
international ﬁnancial market integration, where ﬁrm balance sheets depend on foreign
assets, as in Dedola and Lombardo (2009). Second, some of the issues addressed in
our paper, like debt euroization and monetary integration, may be particularly relevant
for small open economies. A more realistic investigation of such cases would call for
an asymmetric setup, especially while constructing monetary policy games. We leave
these interesting extensions for future research.
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Appendix
A.1 Foreign currency denomination of entrepreneurs’ debt
If loans taken by entrepreneurs are denominated in the foreign currency, the amount
borrowed in the domestic currency can be written as BE,t+1St. The principal due,
however, is equal to BE,t+1St+1, so that entrepreneurs are exposed to exchange rate
risk. The zero proﬁt condition (30) thus becomes:
RE,t+1QT,tPC,tKt+1 [˜ aE,t+1(1 − F1,t+1)+( 1− µ)F2,t+1]=R
∗
tBE,t+1St+1 (A.1)














































In this section we show the analytical formulas for functions of entrepreneurs’ idiosyn-
cratic productivity distribution.
If aE has a log normal distribution F with mean equal to 1, then logaE has a
normal distribution with mean equal to −
σ2
E
2 , where σ2
E is the variance of logaE. This






































where pdf (cdf ) is probability density function (cumulative distribution function) of a
standard normal distribution.
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